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NSC BRIEFING

4 November 1953

# LATEST SOVIET NOTE INDICATES USSR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

- I. During the last three months the Malenkov regime has turned down all Western invitations to talks:
  - A. A series of four Soviet notes has developed new excuses for avoiding four-power talks on Germany.
    - 1. In its latest note of 3 November,
      the USSR demands that the West
      agree first to a conference including Communist China on "international tensions."
  - B. The Kremlin's evasive attitude probably springs from a recognition of the
    weakness of its propaganda position in
    view of its refusal to make any compromise involving the present frontiers

of the orbit.

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- C. At the same time, continued unrest in East Germany and Adenauer's electoral success may have increased the USSR's unwillingness to offer any sort of election proposal in answer to Western demands.
- II. This note makes completely clear what has been implied in several previous ones: the Soviet Union is only willing to discuss Germany at a four-power foreign ministers meeting in conjunction with talks which include China on the broad field of international tensions.
- III. This note and the previous one mentioned several topics suitable for five-power talks:
  - A. Foreign bases;
  - B. The armaments race;
  - C. The danger of war propaganda;

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- D. Establishment of Communist China's "rights" in the UN and other international discussions;
- E. Other problems in Asia.
- IV. This note, like the previous three, reveals an increasingly intransigent attitude on the German issue itself:
  - A. It is the first official statement that the ratification of EDC would make impossible the restoration of Germany as a united state; according to the USSR, consideration of the German problem at a four-power foreign ministers conference would then be pointless.
  - B. This note particularly stresses that a discussion of foreign bases is a pre-requisite to any German settlement.
  - C. The Soviet formula for a German settlement described in previous notes

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remains unchanged. The foreign ministers should set up:

- A peace conference on Germany, to consider a draft treaty drawn up by the four powers. The West has held that free elections must be the first order of business.
- 2. A provisional all-German government which would plan and conduct elections without the interference of other powers. This would not meet Western guarantees for free elections.
- V. The new note criticizes the Western suggestion for talks on European security:
  - A. The USSR denies that EDC is in any way compatible with European security.
  - B. It insists that only its own formula for a German settlement will guarantee European security.

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- C. It cites its bilateral treaties with France and Britain which might be strengthened to improve security.
- D. It hints vaguely at "existing new possibilities for ensuring security in Europe," probably to keep speculation going.
- VI. As in previous notes, the Kremlin by-passed the Western proposal for negotiations on an Austrian state treaty.
- VII. The Malenkov regime has also been refusing during the last few months to permit the holding of a Korean political conference:
  - A. This 3 November note asserts that the USSR cannot accept the UN's invitation since the US Government will not agree to other "neutrals."

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- B. The USSR probably wishes to avoid opposing Western proposals, such as free elections in Korea as well as Germany, which would command wide popular support.
- VIII. The Kremlin has apparently concluded that it will be easier to blame the United States for failure to settle East-West differences if it does not reveal its unyielding hand at the conference table.